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ABSTRACT
This paper offers a first view on the potential economic outcomes for 
American women serving along-side men in combat roles. Specifically, 
this paper examines the impact of deployment and exposure to intense 
combat for women who served in the most high-risk occupations open to 
them in Iraq and Afghanistan on their subsequent use of GI bill benefits for 
higher education. It also compares these women to men who served in the 
same capacities and women who served in lower risk occupations. Women 
in general, and in these occupations in particular, were more likely than 
their male counterparts to use the GI bill. Following deployment, this paper 
presents robust evidence that women in all capacities, and men, were more 
likely to use their GI bill benefits. Moreover, exposure to intense combat, 
which was far more likely to impact these women than other women, 
detracted from their propensity to use the GI bill. This negative impact on 
pursuit of higher education was similar for both men and women. Taken 
together, this paper provides evidence that deployment may benefit the 
young men and women alike who serve in the U.S. military, and that both 
suffer together when faced with exposure to intense fighting.
Introduction
Most of the debate surrounding the 2015 decision to open all combat roles in the U.S. military to women 
has focused on combat readiness. The decision, however, also raises questions regarding the likely 
impact of combat service on women and their families. One way to shed light on that question is to 
consider America’s recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nearly 300,000 American women were 
deployed to serve in Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). While women who 
participated in OEF and OIF were not allowed to serve in combat roles per se, many served alongside 
men in support functions that brought them into harm’s way. It seems pertinent to ask how deployment 
and exposure to intense combat affected these women.
In this paper, I consider the impact of deployment to OEF/OIF, and exposure to combat once 
deployed, on women, particularly women who served in the most dangerous support roles in those 
operations. What was their experience, in terms of deployment and danger, compared with men who 
were deployed in similar roles? How did these women fare when compared with woman who served 
in less demanding or dangerous roles? How did women who deployed fare when compared with those 
who served in the military but did not participate in OEF/OIF?
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While participating in combat can impact those who fight in a variety of ways, this paper focuses 
on a specific preliminary indicator of social and economic well-being – the pursuit of higher education 
post-service. Specifically, this paper asks whether service members used their Montgomery GI bill, 
which provides educational assistance to veterans. Evidence from past conflicts suggests a strong 
relationship between GI bill use and long run earnings. Looking at Vietnam Veterans, Angrist (1990) 
estimates that Veterans’ educational benefits raised schooling 1.4 years and increased lifetime earnings 
by approximately 6%. Hence, I interpret greater interest in the pursuit of higher education, as captured 
by the use of the GI Bill, as a positive sign that a veteran is successfully assimilating back into civilian 
life and showing an active interest in her long-term welfare.
In order to understand the consequences of combat exposure, this paper focuses on the cohort 
of women who served in jobs which accounted for the preponderance of hostile deaths and injuries 
for women. It looks at whether deployment, and exposure to intense combat if deployed, influenced 
subsequent GI bill use among this cohort. I compare these women to men in the same jobs and to 
women in other professions in the U.S. military.
All three cohorts of people were more likely to use their GI bill benefits if they were deployed. 
However, those who were exposed to the most intense fighting were less likely than other deployed 
personnel to use these benefits. Women were more likely than their male counterparts, in general, to 
use the GI bill, and exposure to more intense combat did not detract from GI bill use for women any 
more than it did for men. Women who were in the most high-risk professions were more likely to use 
their GI bill benefits than other women and appear to have had the same responses to deployment 
and combat intensity as other women.
This paper has six sections. Section 2 reviews the literature on the impacts of combat, use of the GI 
bill, and the impact of military service on women. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 explains the 
econometric strategy. Section 5 provides results for a basic model of GI bill use and explores robustness 
to various model specifications and selection issues. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature
A body of literature has been developed that attempts to understand the impact of serving in a war on 
future socio-economic outcomes. To try to understand the impact of serving in war on soldiers drafted 
in World War II and Vietnam, Angrist (1990) used birthdates from the draft lottery as instruments for 
being a combat veteran. The body of literature using this approach has found mixed results on the 
outcomes of veterans. On the one hand, Angrist and Krueger (1994) found that serving in World War 
II reduced future earnings and Autor, Duggan, and Lyle (2011) found declining employment among 
Vietnam era veterans and increasing use of government assistance for these individuals. However, 
Dobkin and Shabani (2009) found little impact on health and Angrist and Chen (2011) found little 
negative economic impact of having served in Vietnam.
An additional line of research studies the specific impact of deployment and combat on the all-vol-
unteer force. Unlike the previous research, this line of research typically compares those who were 
deployed to those who were not. This research, generally, assumes that deployment is exogenous 
among those who serve since individuals neither choose nor are chosen to deploy. Researchers report 
primarily negative consequences of participation in combat on veterans’ earnings, education, divorce 
rates, mental health, and the school performance of their children. (Lyle 2006; Engel, Gallagher, and 
Lyle 2010; Shen et al. 2010; Cesur, Sabia, and Tekin 2013; Negrusa, Negrusa, and Hosek 2014; Edwards 
2015, Armey and Lipow 2015).
The GI bill has proved to be a particularly important channel for mitigating some of these economic 
harms of war. Angrist (1990, 1993) found that veterans’ benefits raise earnings by approximately six per-
cent, while Angrist and Chen (2011) reported seven percent returns. Bound and Turner (2002) reported 
substantial returns to World War II veterans in educational attainment. Lemieux and Card (2001) found 
similar results looking at the returns to the Canadian World War II era GI bill.
There is some evidence that military service has provided an economic benefit to women and 
minorities, particularly through education, and that this long-term advantage continues to motivate 
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many women to serve. This may be important, as the reasons women join may make their experiences 
fundamentally different than men’s experience. Routon (2014) found that veteran women, like minori-
ties, were more likely to go to college than their non-veteran counterparts. Similarly, data from the 2000 
U.S. census suggests higher educational attainment among veteran women than non-veteran women, 
and higher attainment among veteran women than veteran males (Census 2011). Holder (2010) finds 
that post 9–11 female veterans face similar labor market challenges to their male counterparts, and 
she also finds that women are taking advantage of GI bill benefits in unprecedented numbers despite 
joining the service with higher levels of education than past female service members. Taken together, 
it seems that education as well as other economic advantages are a motivator for women to choose 
military service, and an important indicator of post service well-being.
Turning to the impact of combat on women, recent analyses have focused primarily on the health 
outcomes of women who have been deployed and who serve in combat support functions. These 
studies have found very mixed results. Some studies suggest that female veterans face more or different 
health challenges than their male counterparts (see for ex. Carney et al. 2003 and Street, Vogt, and Dutra 
2009), and in some cases have higher rates of PTSD (Hoge, Clark, and Castro 2007). However, Fontana, 
Litz, and Rosenheck (2000) observed similar incidence of PTSD in both men and women peacekeepers. 
Haskell et al. (2009) found that women veterans were less likely to use the VA to address pain and less 
likely to report severe pain. And in comparing women in combat support roles to those in non-com-
bat support roles, Lindstrom et al. (2006) found that the former were less likely to be hospitalized for 
mental health issues.
Thus, a gap persists in the literature for work addressing the impact of combat on women’s economic 
outcomes. The service and combat exposure of U.S. women in OEF/OIF present a new opportunity to 
study the impacts of deployment and combat exposure on women. Arguably, other countries have 
allowed women into combat roles, and some of these women have served in these conflicts, however, 
the numbers of women deployed to combat zones in combat roles remains very small even for those 
countries that allow it.1
To the extent that the military is an important economic equalizer for women, the impact of serving 
in a war on these economic outcomes seems particularly important. Evidence that service in combat 
either positively or negatively impacts use of the GI bill would point toward the kinds of economic out-
comes women are likely to experience in the future as they take on more active role on the front lines.
Data
The data used in this paper comes from administrative data covering all enlisted members of the U.S. 
Armed Forces stored primarily at the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC 2013). I focus my analysis 
on those who volunteered for service prior to September 2004 but had yet to complete their first term 
of service by that date. The choice of the cut-off date was made so as to balance an adequate sample 
size, with adequate numbers of women who were exposed to combat, with an interest in allowing 
enough time to have passed for many of this cohort to have used their Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB).   
Table 1 details all of the variables used in the study.
DMDC provided information on each individual’s OEF/OIF deployments – including their location 
and dates, as well individual deaths and injuries from hostile forces. Using this data, I sought patterns 
in hostile deaths and injuries for women by profession. Table 2 lists these professions and the female 
fatalities and casualties associated with them. Women in these professions experienced more than 50% 
of the combat related injuries and fatalities women sustained in OEF and OIF. I use this group as my main 
cohort for analysis, it is comprised of about 34,000 individuals. I also compare these service members 
and their experiences with about 96,000 men in the same jobs and 88,000 women in other military jobs.
From the deployment and injury data, I construct two treatment variables. The first is a dummy 
variable for whether someone was deployed during their first term of enlistment. Second, I construct 
a dummy variable for whether or not an individual’s unit suffered fatalities while the individual was 
deployed. I use this second dummy as a proxy for whether or not the individual faced intense combat.
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The MGIB, which commenced in 1984, provides up to 36 months of benefits, worth as much as 
$70,000, toward education expenses for veterans who commence studies within ten years of discharge 
from military service. Use of the MGIB requires completing a minimum term and a $100 per month 
contribution during the first year of service, and the service member must be in at least their third year 
of active service or have received an honorable discharge to use the benefit. The Veterans Administration 
(VA) provided the MGIB usage data and I created a dummy variable for whether a service member 
used the MGlB.
Additional DMDC data provides control variables such as each individual’s race and gender. The data 
also includes annual updates of marital status, number of children, rank, and job, or Military Occupation 
Specialty (MOS), for as long as the individual is in uniform. It also includes percentile scores on the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The AFQT is a subtest of the larger Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery (ASVAB), and is formed from a composite score of four general areas: arithmetic reasoning, word 
knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and mathematics knowledge. Volunteers with AFQT scores 
below the 31st percentile are rarely allowed to enlist. I include these variables as they could influence 
veterans’ interest in tertiary education.
Finally, one might expect that economic conditions could impact an individual’s choice to pursue 
employment, stay in the military, or go to school. To account for this I include the U.S. unemployment 
rate during the year that a service member’s first term ended.
Table 3 provides summary statistics. The first column summarizes the characteristics of the cohort 
of primary interest: the women who served in risky professions in their first-term of enlistment. For 
comparison, I provide the same descriptive statistics for men who served in these same professions, and 
women in other professions. I also compare descriptive statistics of those women in risky professions 
who deployed with those who did not.
Table 1. Variables.
Variable Value Definition
MGIB Use 1,0 Value of 1 if service member has begun to use MGIB benefits
Deployed 1,0 Value of 1 if service member was deployed during first term
Unit Mortality 1,0 Value of 1 if unit experienced a fatality while service member was deployed
Unit 30% Deployed 1,0 Value of 1 if a service member’s unit deployed 30% of its personnel sometime in service 
member’s first term of enlistment
Quit First Term 1,0 Value of 1 if service member did not reenlist for a second term
AFQT Percentile 1–98 Percentile score on AFQT
Age 20–56 Age at first term end
Married 1,0 Value of 1 if married at first term end
Children 1,0 Value of 1 if service member had children at first term end. 
African American 1,0 Value of 1 if self-identified as Black
Hispanic 1,0 Value of 1 if self-identified as Hispanic
Asian 1,0 Value of 1 if self-identified as Asian
Risky Job 1,0 Value of 1 if service member had one of the MOSs listed in table 2
Female 1,0 Value of 1 if female
Unemployment 0.042–0.098 U.S. unemployment rate the year First Term Ended
Table 2. Female Fatality and Hostile Injury Rates in Riskiest MOSs.
Professions Deaths Professions Hostile Injuries
Law enforcement 10 Law Enforcement 122
Supply 6 Vehicle Operator 93
Vehicle operator 5 Medical 80
Medical 3 Supply 41
Automotive 3 Food Service 26
Missile Fuel 3 Missle Fuel 20
Food Service 2 Automotive 8
Percent total 0.542372881   0.579494799






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6  L. ARMEY
Notable here, women in general, and women in high-risk jobs in particular, are more likely than 
men to use the GI bill, consistent with the literature on women’s post-service economic performance. 
Women in these risky jobs who did deploy, were more likely to use their MGIB benefits than those who 
did not. There are some other notable differences across groups as well. Women in high risk jobs were 
less likely to have children than men or women in other jobs. Men and women in these jobs were very 
unlikely to reenlist at the end of their first term.
Women in risky jobs were also somewhat more likely to be deployed than women in other positions 
but less likely than men in the same jobs. Similarly, they were less likely to serve in deployed units than 
men in the same set of positions. Women in high risk jobs who did deploy were less likely to have chil-
dren than those who did not, and were also more likely to leave service at the end of their first term. 
Taken together these facts suggest that women in high-risk position who deployed were different from 
their counterparts who did not.
Thus, there is evidence that deployment may actually positively influence the likelihood that women 
in high risk jobs use the MGIB. However, given the differences in characteristics of these groups, the 
next sections present the strategies for controlling for these differences and their further implications.
Econometric Strategy
This paper estimates the probability of using the Montgomery GI bill based on one’s first term deploy-
ment experiences and other control variables. I first employ a basic logit model for whether or not 
someone uses their MGIB. In addition to treatment variables – deployment and combat intensity - I 
add controls for age, family status, AFQT score, race, MOS, and the economic conditions at the end of 
the first term of enlistment.
To measure the differential treatment effect on females relative to males, and women in risky posi-
tions relative to those in other jobs, I included dummy variables and interaction terms in the cohorts 
of all personnel in risky jobs and all women. In the analysis of all personnel with high-risk jobs I include 
a dummy variable for female and a dummy variable for females who were deployed. In the all-female 
cohort, I include a dummy variable for high-risk jobs and one for deployment and high-risk employment. 
In measuring the impact of exposure to fatalities, I once again include the dummy variable for females 
in the analysis of all personnel with high-risk jobs, and a dummy variable for high-risk employment in 
the all-female analysis. I also interact female with unit fatalities, and high risk employment with unit 
fatalities, respectively.
As a test for the robustness of the logit results, I look at various modeling issues that might impact 
the accuracy of the result. One concern is that the decision to use the MGIB is related to the decision 
to reenlist, a decision which could also be influenced by exposure to combat. To deal with this Simon, 
Negrusa, and Warner (2010) use a Heckman style selection model to control for common factors driv-
ing the decision to leave the military and the decision to use the MGIB subsequent to leaving. While 
most service members do leave the military prior to going to school, some use their GI bill while they 
are still in the military, and some may decide to leave in order to use their GI bill. I thus model these as 
overlapping decisions using binomial probit instead.
As a final check for robustness, I correct for selection to deployment and high-risk units. Most 
recent studies have treated deployment as random. The rationale goes that if one joins the military, 
one has little impact on the unit to which one gets assigned and no ability to impact whether the 
unit gets sent to a combat zone. As most personnel deploy with their units, assignment to combat 
is as good as random. However, recent work casts doubt on the validity of this approach. Armey, 
Berck, and Lipow (2016) found that being African-American, having children, and being married 
greatly reduced the likelihood of deployment among those in combat jobs. Moreover, our descriptive 
statistics clearly indicate that there are differences between deployed and non-deployed personnel 
in the same jobs.
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There are several choices for correcting for this selection to treatment, i.e. selection for deployment 
that one can use to more accurately measure the treatment effect. Most of these essentially involve 
weighting the un-deployed sample with the probability they would have been deployed. Wooldridge 
(2010) suggests inverse probability weighted regression adjustment. This model, implemented with 
STATA 13’s teffects command, allows one to estimate both the outcome and the treatment probability. 
It also allows for both the outcome and treatment to be modeled as logits, which eases the compar-
ison with earlier models and is appropriate for the binomial outcome variable, MGIB use. This model 
is considered robust to misspecification in either the outcome or treatment probability, or is ‘doubly 
robust’ unlike other potential corrections for assignment to treatment.
Results
I find that across all groups and models, deployment increases use of the MGIB, while combat 
intensity lowers the use of the MGIB. In Table 4, Deployment increases the odds of MGIB use across 
all groups from 6.5 to 10 percent.2 These results are significant at the 99 percent level. Controlling 
for the decision to leave service using the bivariate probit in Table 5, being deployed has a positive 
and significant (99% level) impact on the decision to leave, and it also has a positive and significant 
(99% level) impact on the choice to use the GI bill across all cohorts. The propensity is greater, 
both to use the GI bill and to leave service, for women in high-risk professions than either of the 
other cohorts.
Women in high risk positions are particularly inclined to use their GI bill benefits. Relatively speaking, 
Table 4 suggests that they are 75% more likely than their male counterparts to use the GI bill. However, 
deployment appears to have the same impact on women as men in these positions. Similarly, women 
Table 4. Impact of deployment Montgomery G.I. bill use logit.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Variables Women Risky Job All  Risky Job Women All Jobs
Deployed 0.0768*** 0.0630*** 0.0947***
  (0.0253) (0.0152) (0.0170)
Marriage 0.249*** 0.0402** 0.219***
  (0.0292) (0.0176) (0.0156)
Children −0.153*** −0.106*** −0.132***
  (0.0157) (0.00828) (0.00881)
Age −0.0260*** −0.0210*** −0.0265***
  (0.00315) (0.00159) (0.00175)
African-American 0.0530** 0.0439*** 0.0778***
  (0.0265) (0.0153) (0.0144)
Asian 0.0195 0.262*** −0.0152
  (0.0717) (0.0358) (0.0370)
Hispanic 0.0622* 0.209*** 0.0659***
  (0.0364) (0.0194) (0.0199)
AFQT 0.00135** 0.00692*** 0.00383***
  (0.000679) (0.000351) (0.000320)
Unemployment 3.883*** −0.114 2.186***
  (1.499) (0.750) (0.803)
Female   0.562***  
    (0.0177)  
Female deployed   0.0204  
    (0.0295)  
Female w/risky job     0.193***
      (0.0166)
Risky job deployed     −0.0115
      (0.0304)
Constant −0.0580 −0.795*** −0.293***
  (0.105) (0.0531) (0.0579)
Observations 30,393 117,199 114,899
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with high-risk jobs are about 20% more likely than other women to use the GI bill, but not any more 
or less likely to react to deployment.
The Bivariate probit in Table 5 sheds some light on whether the propensity to use the GI bill is a 
result of different propensities to leave service for women or those in high risk positions. Deployment 
leads to a greater propensity for women in high risk positions to leave service than men in comparable 
positions. This result is significant at the 99% level. Once this propensity is accounted for, women who 
were deployed are no more likely to use their GI bill post-deployment than men.
Deployment similarly discourages women in high risk professions from reenlisting to a greater degree 
than women in lower risk positions, and women in high-risk positions are less likely to reenlist than 
those in low-risk positions in the first place. Once these propensities for leaving are taken into account, 
the result is consistent with the first model, deployment increases the propensity for service members 
to use the GI bill.
In Table 6, I report the results of the IPWRA analysis which predicts a positive effect of deployment 
across groups, but at a much lower rate than the previous analysis. The models predict 1.5–2.5% increase 
in odds of use of the GI bill following deployment. This models deployment as a function of the same 
observables as GI bill use to correct the treatment effect.
Notably, it appears from this analysis that these observables are important predictors of deployment. 
Moreover, once this selection is controlled for, the positive impact of deployment, while still significant 
across groups at the 99 percent level, is much smaller. This suggests that selection for deployment is 
Table 5. Impact of deployment quitting and Montgomery G.I. bill benefit use bivariate probit.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Variables







Deployed 0.459*** 0.0471*** 0.383*** 0.0364*** 0.221*** 0.0567***
  (0.0231) (0.0158) (0.0124) (0.00913) (0.0117) (0.0105)
Marriage −0.224*** 0.152*** −0.335*** 0.0180* −0.130*** 0.131***
  (0.0234) (0.0181) (0.0135) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.00961)
Children 0.0203 −0.0917*** 0.0276*** −0.0591*** −0.0411*** −0.0786***
  (0.0124) (0.00954) (0.00616) (0.00484) (0.00587) (0.00532)
Age 0.00273 −0.0159*** 0.00462*** −0.0124*** 0.00646*** −0.0156***
  (0.00254) (0.00193) (0.00121) (0.000941) (0.00120) (0.00105)
African-American −0.0707*** 0.0339** −0.0624*** 0.0274*** −0.0285*** 0.0520***
  (0.0215) (0.0165) (0.0121) (0.00925) (0.00989) (0.00888)
Asian −0.345*** 0.00983 −0.417*** 0.153*** −0.200*** −0.00958
  (0.0519) (0.0447) (0.0255) (0.0220) (0.0242) (0.0228)
Hispanic −0.0113 0.0381* −0.123*** 0.126*** 0.0431*** 0.0412***
  (0.0302) (0.0227) (0.0152) (0.0118) (0.0140) (0.0123)
AFQT −0.00721*** 0.000814* −0.00358*** 0.00419*** −0.00151*** 0.00240***
  (0.000539) (0.000423) (0.000273) (0.000212) (0.000214) (0.000199)
Unemployment 10.23*** 2.351** 10.54*** −0.0239 8.210*** 1.374***
  (1.237) (0.931) (0.598) (0.450) (0.555) (0.496)
Female     −0.0522*** 0.343***    
      (0.0132) (0.0108)    
Female deployed     0.0791*** 0.0147    
      (0.0262) (0.0181)    
Female w/ risky job         0.415*** 0.123***
          (0.0120) (0.0102)
Risky job deployed         0.240*** −0.00735
          (0.0256) (0.0188)
Athrho   0.409***   0.368***   0.522***
    (0.0133)   (0.00744)   (0.00609)
Constant 0.974*** −0.0398 0.824*** −0.502*** 0.227*** −0.206***
  (0.0872) (0.0651) (0.0422) (0.0317) (0.0402) (0.0355)
Observations 30,393 30,393 117,199 117,199 114,899 114,899


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10  L. ARMEY
indeed an important issue. It also suggests, however, that the impact of the deployment experience 
can be positive, or at least neutral, in people’s lives.
Turning to combat intensity and its impact on GI bill use, the effect of unit mortality among the 
deployed is generally negative. In the logit models in Table 7, among those women deployed in high 
risk professions, unit mortality reduced the likelihood that they would use their MGIB by 45%. However, 
this result is only statistically significant at the 95% level. For all personnel deployed in risky jobs the 
reduction was about 57% and is significant at the 99% level. Women in general saw fewer unit fatalities 
which perhaps accounts for the lower significance level, and the lack of significance for the third category 
of women in general. Neither of the interaction terms are significant meaning that women did not react 
in the long run significantly differently than men in response to being in units with fatalities, nor were 
women in risky professions more or less able to cope upon returning home with high intensity combat.
The results of the initial model are generally robust to the bivariate probit model in Table 8. The 
bivariate probit suggests that all personnel were less likely to leave the service if exposed to unit 
mortalities. This seemingly strange result is in-line with findings of a 2006 Rand report in which many 
service members reported a greater intention to stay in the military if they had been involved in combat 
operations (Hosek, Kavanagh, and Miller 2006). This may be a result of unobservable heterogeneity 
– those in higher risk units may be there because they are more suited to military life in some way. 
Alternatively, those who have experienced in-unit casualties may feel a greater sense of obligation to 
‘get the job done’ and reenlist accordingly.
Table 7. Impact of unit fatalities on those deployed Montgomery G.I. bill use logit.




Risky Job Risky Job All Jobs
Unit Mortality −0.757** −0.559*** −0.139
  (0.318) (0.0758) (0.118)
Marriage 0.0983* −0.125*** 0.0536*
  (0.0523) (0.0273) (0.0309)
Children −0.134*** −0.110*** −0.102***
  (0.0281) (0.0124) (0.0176)
Age −0.0373*** −0.0124*** −0.0482***
(0.00595) (0.00261) (0.00370)
African-American 0.000382 0.0170 −0.0486*
  (0.0478) (0.0243) (0.0291)
Asian 0.0495 0.263*** −0.123
  (0.128) (0.0559) (0.0754)
Hispanic 0.0923 0.183*** 0.0716*
  (0.0625) (0.0298) (0.0375)
AFQT 0.000944 0.00722*** 0.000799
  (0.00120) (0.000535) (0.000664)
Unemployment 24.82*** 13.41*** 18.92***
  (3.016) (1.213) (1.629)
Female   0.583***  
    (0.0242)  
Female with Unit Mortality   −0.178  
    (0.323)  
Female w/ risky job     0.144***
      (0.0266)
Risky job with Unit Mortality     −0.549
      (0.337)
Constant −0.767*** −1.613*** −0.294**
  (0.212) (0.0890) (0.121)
Observations 9501 49,423 28,501
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Less surprising, among those who leave service, personnel who were in units with fatalities 
were less likely to use the MGIB. This negative impact on MGIB use is significant among women 
in high-risk jobs and high-risk jobs in general (99% level). However, notably, women actually 
were significantly less adversely affected by in unit fatalities than their male counterparts (see 
Table 9).
Finally, controlling for selection to more dangerous units, the impact of hostile deaths on men and 
women’s propensities to use the MGIB by a more moderate 11–15 percent. The impact on women in 
low risk occupations was insignificant. Here, controlling for selection may be less important as the first 
stage predictors are largely insignificant, particularly for women. The small difference between the 
impact on men and women of combat exposure provides evidence that men and women fare similarly 
when faced with killing and dying. The results suggest that both men and women, when exposed to 
intense combat, potentially have a more difficult time moving on with their lives than others who have 
served in war.
Table 8. Impact of fatalities quitting and Montgomery G.I. bill benefit use bivariate probit.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Variables







Unit Mortality −0.604*** −0.455** −1.280*** −0.338*** −0.271*** −0.0931
  (0.217) (0.187) (0.0399) (0.0434) (0.0763) (0.0729)
Marriage −0.239*** 0.0572* −0.345*** −0.0794*** −0.0773*** 0.0277
  (0.0503) (0.0324) (0.0240) (0.0164) (0.0236) (0.0190)
Children −0.0462* −0.0789*** 0.0228** −0.0623*** −0.0881*** −0.0580***
  (0.0263) (0.0170) (0.0106) (0.00728) (0.0131) (0.0105)
Age 0.0246*** −0.0226*** 0.00774*** −0.00705*** 0.0279*** −0.0283***
  (0.00635) (0.00363) (0.00239) (0.00156) (0.00297) (0.00221)
African-American −0.0849* 0.00181 −0.0641*** 0.0112 0.000819 −0.0258
  (0.0469) (0.0297) (0.0224) (0.0146) (0.0222) (0.0180)
Asian −0.105 0.0310 −0.398*** 0.157*** −0.117** −0.0752
  (0.117) (0.0795) (0.0447) (0.0343) (0.0539) (0.0464)
Hispanic 0.106 0.0585 −0.0841*** 0.111*** 0.166*** 0.0470**
  (0.0662) (0.0389) (0.0270) (0.0181) (0.0304) (0.0233)
AFQT −0.0124*** 0.000552 −0.00490*** 0.00432*** −0.00642*** 0.000469
  (0.00114) (0.000745) (0.000481) (0.000322) (0.000496) (0.000412)
Unemployment 12.44*** 15.37*** 9.214*** 8.251*** 9.022*** 11.84***
  (3.161) (1.848) (1.089) (0.735) (1.235) (1.005)
Female     −0.0485** 0.357***    
      (0.0234) (0.0149)    
Female with Unit 
Mortality
    0.734*** −0.113    
      (0.218) (0.190)    
Female w/ risky 
job
        0.611*** 0.0921***
          (0.0231) (0.0165)
Risky job with Unit 
Mortality
        −0.312 −0.319
Athrho   0.465***   0.395***   0.607***
    (0.0307)   (0.0141)   (0.0143)
Constant 1.110*** −0.487*** 1.353*** −1.003*** 0.176* −0.228***
  (0.228) (0.130) (0.0819) (0.0538) (0.0954) (0.0742)
Observations 9501 9501 49,423 49,423 28,501 28,501
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Conclusion
Across specifications and models, participating in the war in OEF/OIF does not appear to negatively 
impact the educational pursuits of those who serve. In fact, serving in a war may be an experience that 
galvanizes young people to come home and be more productive with their lives. In other words, the 
interest in higher education by returning service members suggests a lower time discount rate as a 
result of going to war, a mark of adulthood.
The results herein, however, suggest that exposure to violence may be moderately detrimental and 
can undermine veterans’ efforts to move on with their lives. When faced with in unit fatalities, both men 
and women are less likely to pursue higher education.
Perhaps most important for the purpose of this paper, serving in a war influences women’s educa-
tional attainment in much the same way it influences men’s. If anything, the positive impact of deploy-
ment on educational attainment was greater for women than for their male counterparts. Moreover, 
serving in dangerous capacities also does not appear to unduly harm female service members’ educa-
tional attainment. Nor did exposure to intense combat undermine female service members’ pursuit of 




2.  To measure these impacts I exponentiate the logit coefficients to generate odds ratios. Odds ratios give the 
difference in the odds an outcome occurs for a categorical variable relative to the base, or they give the percentage 
change in odds for a one-unit increase in a continuous variable. For example, an odds ratio of 1.02 represents a 2% 
increase in odds of deployment while an odds ratio of 0.98 represents a 2% decrease in the odds of deployment.
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